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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MILITARY ENLISTED PERSON-
NEL MAY NOT RECOVER DAMAGES FROM SUPERIOR OF-
FICERS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
Wallace was one of five black Navy enlisted men who claimed that
their superior officers had violated their constitutional rights by dis-
criminating against the men on the basis of race.' The enlisted men
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunc-
tive relief. The district court granted the officers' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint.2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics3 authorized an
award of damages for the constitutional violations alleged by the en-
listed men,4 unless either the acts complained of were non-reviewable
military decisions, or the officers were immune from suit.' On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a unanimous opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger.6 The Court reasoned that the presence
of "special factors counselling hesitation"7 precluded it from making
the Bivens damages remedy available,8 and held that "enlisted military
personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior
officer for alleged constitutional violations."9
The evolution of the Bivens cause of action, or the judicially im-
plied "constitutional tort,"' 0 is well documented." In Bivens v. Six Un-
1. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983). The acts alleged to be racially dis-
criminatory included assignment to undesirable duties, imposition of unusally se-
vere punishments, and the giving of low performance evaluations. Id at 2364.
2. Id at 2364. As grounds for dismissal the district court indicated that the enlisted
men had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, the alleged actions were
non-reviewable military decisions, and the officers were immune from suit.
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4. Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 730 n.l (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2362
(1983).
5. Id. at 737. The court of appeals set out certain tests to determine these issues, and
remanded to the district court for application of those tests. Id at 734, 736.
6. The Chief Justice vigorously dissented to the majority's opinion in Bivens, mainly
because of a concern to protect the separation of powers. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
7. Id at 396.
8. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983).
9. Id at 2368. The Chappell Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the enlisted men could maintain their additional claim for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 1985(3) allows recovery of
damages by persons injured as a result of "two or more persons" conspiring to
interfere with their civil rights, specifically, conspiring "for the purpose of depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protec-
tion of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." Id
10. "Constitutional tort" is a term including any actions alleging a violation of consti-
tutional rights, including actions brought under a statute allowing damages for
deprivations of constitutional rights by one acting under color of state law. Com-
ment, Bivens and the Creation of a Cause of Action for Money Damages Arising
Directly from the Due Process Clauses, 29 EMORY L.J. 231, 233 n.10 (1980); see
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known Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 12 a private citizen
claimed damages for violations, by federal officials, of his fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
He brought suit against the individual officials on the theory that the
fourth amendment itself, even in the absence of a statute authorizing a
cause of action, provided an independent basis for relief.'3 The Bivens
Court reasoned that even though the fourth amendment does not ex-
pressly provide for a damages remedy, such a remedy could be granted
because the Court had statutory jurisdiction to hear the claim, and
therefore the power to use any historically available remedy to redress
the injury.' n
The Bivens opinion suggested, however, that the exercise of this
power might be inappropriate in two situations. First, the existence of
an explicit congressional directive requiring the use of some other rem-
edy, viewed by Congress as equally effective, would militate against the
federal courts' use of their power to grant a damages remedy.' 5 Sec-
ond, even in the absence of congressional action, special factors coun-
seling hesitation might also preclude federal courts from using their
power.' 6 The Court's only amplification in Bivens of what it might
consider such special factors was a reference to two decisions, United
States v. Standard Oil Co. '" and United Slates v. Gilman, " both of
which discussed federal fiscal policy. 9
In those opinions the Court had reasoned that creation of a new
common law damages remedy required it to make policy decisions that
it characterized as determinations of federal fiscal policy more appro-
priately left to Congress.20 In addition, the Court found Gilman to im-
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV 1980) (providing damages remedy for unconstitu-
tional acts of state officials).
11. Eg., Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1983); Dellinger, Of Rights and Reme-
dies- The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972); Lehmann, Biv-
ens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts
Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531 (1977); Com-
ment, Righting Constitutional Wrongs.- The Development of a Constitutionally Im-
plied Cause of Action for Damages, 19 DuQ. L. REV. 107 (1980).
12. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
13. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Bivens was precluded from using existing state law
remedies because the government officials were protected by a federal common
law immunity. Lehmann, supra note 11, at 532-33.
14. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96; see also Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2411 (1983)
(expanding and clarifying the Bivens reasoning).
15. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; see also Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1983) (clari-
fying this limitation on the Bivens remedy); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19
(1980) (applying and interpreting the limitation). Discussion of this limitation on
the Bivens cause of action is beyond the scope of this casenote.
16. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
17. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
18. 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
19. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954); Standard Oil, 332 U.S.
301 (1947)).
20. Gilman, 347 U.S. at 509-13; Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 314-17.
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plicate policy decisions relating to government employment, including
employee discipline, morale, and efficiency.2' Congress, the Court
stated, should be the branch to make these decisions and thus to formu-
late the policy concerning relations between federal agencies and their
staffs. 22 The Gilman Court therefore refused to create damage reme-
dies that would redress the government for injuries sustained as the
result of common law torts.23
When the Supreme Court next discussed the special factors limita-
tion in Davis v. Passman, 24 it did so without reference to either Stan-
dard Oil or Gilman. In Davis, a female administrative assistant to a
United States Congressman sued him for damages, alleging that termi-
nation of her employment constituted gender discrimination in viola-
tion of her fifth amendment rights. 25 The Court found this Bivens -type
cause of action to raise special factors counseling hesitation. 26 These
special factors related to a concern that the judiciary, by fashioning a
damages remedy, might inhibit the independent functioning of the leg-
islature.27 Similar concerns, the Davis Court reasoned, had motivated
the Framers of the Constitution to adopt the speech or debate clause of
the Constitution.28 This clause protects federal legislators' indepen-
dence from judicial inhibition by granting them an immunity from
suits arising from the conduct of their official duties. 29 The Court de-
termined that if the congressman had not acted within the scope of his
legislative duties, then the Court was free to provide the Bivens remedy,
because the danger of judicial inhibition of independent legislative
processes would be absent; that is, no special factor counseling hesita-
tion would be present.
30
In Bush v. Lucas, 31 the Supreme Court returned to the Standard
Oil and Gilman decisions as a means of elucidating the definition of
special factors counseling hesitation.32 The Bush Court determined
that as illustrated by those cases, the special factors to be considered
before allowing a Bivens remedy related not to the merits of the remedy
sought, but rather "to the question of who [Congress or the courts]
should decide whether such a remedy should be provided. ' 33 The
21. Gilman, 347 U.S. at 509-10.
22. Id. at 511-13.
23. Id.; see Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 314-17.
24. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
25. Id at 230-31.
26. Id at 246.
27. See id at 235 n.ll, 246.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
29. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 235 n.ll.
30. See id at 246.
31. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983). Bush, which was decided the same day as Chappell v.
Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983), was relied upon by the Chappell Court. Id at
2364, 2367.
32. Bush, 103 S. Ct. at 2411-12.
33. Id at 2412.
358 [Voi. 13
Court therefore refused to create a damages remedy for Bush, a federal
civil service employee who alleged violations of his first amendment
rights by his superior because, as in Standard Oil and Gilman, it found
reason for Congress, and not the Court, to prescribe the scope of
relief.
3 4
In reaching its decision, the Bush Court noted that Congress had
created an elaborate remedial system to provide redress for civil service
employees injured by their superiors' improper action.35 This system
included meaningful, though less than complete, remedies for civil ser-
vants injured by violation of their first amendment rights.36 Congress
had carefully constructed this remedial system in a step-by-step fashion
with particular attention to conflicting interests.37 These interests in-
cluded concerns with providing job security, protecting free speech,
and maintainng discipline and efficiency in the federal workforce.38
The Court was concerned that the addition of a judicial remedy to
this existing system might disrupt discipline and therefore reduce the
efficiency of the civil service.39 The Court reasoned that Congress, be-
cause of its expertise gained in creating the existing remedial system,
could best determine whether an additional damages remedy would, in
fact, disrupt discipline and reduce efficiency. If Congress determined
that this additional remedy would indeed cause reduced efficiency, it
would then be in a better position than the Court to balance the interest
in efficiency against the interest in protecting civil servants' constitu-
tional rights, and thus finally to decide whether it would be good policy
to provide a damages remedy. In these circumstances, the Court de-
clined to decide whether it would be good policy to augment the ex-
isting remedial system by providing a Bivens remedy, and therefore
refused to provide that remedy, finding that Congress's superior ability
to make this policy decision was a special factor counseling
hesitation.4"
Chappell v. Wallace,4 like Davis and Bush, involved a civil suit
brought by federal employees who alleged a violation of their constitu-
tional rights by superiors.42 A Bivens special factor analysis was there-
fore appropriate to determine if the Court could provide a damages
remedy. Chappell, however, arose in a military context, a distinction of
critical significance, because the law of intramilitary civil liability is
pervasively affected by the Supreme Court's 1950 landmark opinion in
34. Id at 2416-17.
35. Id. at 2415-16.
36. Id at 2408, 2415.
37. Id at 2414-16.
38. Id at 2414-15.
39. See id at 2417.
40. See id
41. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
42. Id. at 2364.
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Feres v. United States. 43 Feres involved lawsuits brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)4 seeking recovery from the federal
government for injuries to soldiers sustained as the result of negligent
acts committed by superior officers in the course of military duty.45
The Court found the government not liable to the soldiers, holding that
Congress, in enacting the FTCA, had not intended the selective waiver
of sovereign immunity under the FTCA to extend to liability for inju-
ries sustained incident to military service. 46 In a subsequent decision,
47
the Court observed that the Feres rule was best explained by recogniz-
ing that a special relationship exists between soldiers and their superi-
ors, and by understanding that lawsuits brought by soldiers against the
United States, based upon individual intramilitary negligence, would
affect the discipline upon which this relationship depends.48
This concern with protecting military discipline led the Chappell
Court to begin its consideration of special factors counseling hesitation
with an analysis of the effects on military discipline and efficiency that
would result from the addition of a new damages remedy to the ex-
isting system of military justice.49 The likely impairment of military
efficiency, measured by the certain disruption of the "'peculiar and
43. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). This area of the law is affected by the lower courts' expan-
sion of the Feres rule into a broad doctrine of intramilitary immunity. See Note,
Torts-Military Service Immunity--There Is No Cause ofAction Under the Constitu-
tion Against Government Officials for Intentional Constitutional Torts Occurring In-
cident to Military Service, 27 VILL. L. REV. 858, 869-72 (1981-1982) (discussing
broad application of Feres doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Note, Torts-Military
Service]. See generaly Note, Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional Torts, 80
MIcH. L, REv. 312 (1981) (pre-Chappell exploration of relationship of Feres doc-
trine to intramilitary constitutional torts) [hereinafter cited as Note, Intramilitary
Immunity]; Note, Denial ofAtomic Veterans' Tort Claims: The Enduring Fallout
from Feres v. United States, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1983) (examining
harsh results of expansion of Feres doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Note, Atomic
Veterans'].
Intramilitary immunity bars suit not only against the government for negli-
gent torts committed incident to service (the Feres rule), see, e.g., Shaw v. United
States, 448 F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969), but also against individual officials for
negligent torts, see, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975);
Roach v. Shields, 371 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1974), intentional torts, see, e.g.,
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Waukegan v. United States, 594 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1979);
Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), affid mem. on other
grounds, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and judicially implied constitutional
torts, see, e.g., Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Nagy
v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979).
44. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a discussion of the FTCA,
see Note, Torts-Military Service, supra note 43, at 860-61.
45. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-38.
46. Id at 146.
47. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
48. Id at 162 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)); see also
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (quoting the
same language and following Feres).
49. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365 (1983).
Chappell v. Wallace
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors' that might result if
the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court" was of pri-
mary concern to the Court.5" The Court reasoned that an effective mil-
itary requires a strict discipline and regulation that would be
unacceptable in a civilian setting.5' This strict discipline assures the
unhesitating obedience to command necessary to the success of a mili-
tary organization.52 It is acceptable, therefore, to limit the rights of
military personnel to a degree not permitted in civilian life to maintain
military discipline and thus effective military function.53 The Court
concluded that a judicially created damages remedy that exposed of-
ficers to personal liability for violations of enlisted men's constitutional
rights would undermine military discipline.54 The Chappell Court
found this potential disruption to effective military function as a special
factor counseling hesitation to provide a Bivens remedy to the enlisted
men.
55
Turning from this analysis to reasoning analogous to that em-
ployed in Bush v. Lucas, 56 the Chappell Court then discussed the rea-
sons why Congress, and not the courts, should prescribe the scope of
available relief. The Court believed that the Framers had anticipated
the possibility that the judicial branch might tamper with the military
system of discipline, and had guarded against such an event by explic-
itly granting Congress plenary authority over internal military affairs. 57
Furthermore, Congress had exercised its authority by establishing a
comprehensive internal system of military justice that included means
to redress the constitutional wrongs alleged by the enlisted men.58 The
Court noted that out of respect for Congress's authority, and in recog-
50. Id at 2367 (quoting Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 676
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
51. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365 (1983).
52. See id
53. See id (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion)); see
also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental necessity for
obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render
permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissi-
ble outside it."); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("Discrimination is
unavoidable in the Army. Some must be assigned to dangerous missions; others
find soft spots.").
54. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983). It is unclear why a legislatively
created damages remedy would not have the same effect. The same considera-
tions guiding the Court would presumably also be of concern to Congress should
it decide to create a statutory damages remedy for military personnel injured by
the unconstitutional acts of their superiors.
55. Id
56. 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983).
57. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2365-66 (1983); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cls. 12-14.
58. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2366 (1983); see The Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982). For a discussion of the provi-
sions within the UCMJ that protect the constitutional rights of military personnel,
see Note, Intramilitary Immunity, supra note 43, at 329-30.
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nition of the Court's own lack of competence in the area of internal
military affairs, it had habitually declined to review or reverse con-
gressional decisions concerning matters of military justice and person-
nel management.59 Therefore, the Chappell Court concluded that
adding a judicially created damages remedy to the existing legislatively
created system of military justice would encroach upon Congress's au-
thority in the area.6' Thus, Congress's authority and activity in the
field of intramilitary affairs, taken together with "the unique discipli-
nary structure of the military establishment," constituted special factors
counseling against providing a Bivens remedy to the enlisted men.6 1
In all of the cases in which the Supreme Court has found the exist-
ence of special factors counseling hesitation, the factors related to a
possible judicial intrusion into areas the Court considered reserved to
Congress.62 Bush and Chappell concerned potential intrusions into
matters of federal personnel policy.63 In both cases, the plaintiffs de-
manded relief that, if granted, would have resulted in judicial enlarge-
ments of existing legislatively created remedial systems designed to
redress employees' grievances.' Underlying the Court's decision in
these cases is a concern that litigation arising from these additional
remedies would deleteriously affect employee discipline and morale,
hence reducing efficient operation of the federal service, whether civil
or military.65
59. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2366-67 (1983); see also Rostker v. Gold-
berg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1981) (Court deferred to congressional authority over the
military, and declined to invalidate statute excluding women from draft registra-
tion); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (Court refused to find stat-
ute mandating different requirements for promotion of female officers than for
male officers unconstitutional because courts defer to Congress in military affairs);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (civilian courts lack competence in mili-
tary affairs and therefore will not examine patterns of weaponry, training, and
orders of state's national guard); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)
(Court refused to review specific duty assignments of an army doctor because ju-
diciary must be scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate army matters).
60. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983).
61. Id.
62. See id. at 2367 ("Any action to provide a judicial response by way of such a
remedy would be plainly inconsistent with Congress' authority in this field.");
Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2417 (1983) ("[W]e are convinced that Congress is
in a better position to decide .... ); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n. 11
(1979) ("The Clause is therefore a paradigm example of '[a] textually demonstra-
ble constitutional commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment.'") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)); United States v.
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 513 (1954) ("That function is more appropriately for those
who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them."); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 316 (1947) ("[Eixercise of judicial power to estab-
lish the new liability ... would be intruding within a field properly within Con-
gress' control .... ).
63. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2412 (1983); see Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct.
2362, 2365 (1983).
64. See supra notes 33-39 & 56-59 and accompanying text.
65. See Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct.
Chappell v. Wallace
In Bush and Gilman the Court reasoned that it had adequate
power to decide whether it would be good policy to provide an addi-
tional damages remedy.66 Congress, however, was more experienced
with civil service personnel issues, and therefore was better prepared
and more competent to determine the effects of an additional remedy
on employee discipline and morale, and hence on service efficiency.
67
Congress's ability to better evaluate the discipline, morale, and effi-
ciency issues thus placed it in a better position than the Court to decide
whether it would be good policy to provide a damages remedy. As a
result, the Court declined to provide this remedy by judical action.
68
In Chappell, however, the Court did not find Congress better pre-
pared or more competent to determine the effect on military efficiency
that would result from augmenting the existing system of military jus-
tice with a damages remedy. The Court found ample judicial prece-
dent upon which to base its own conclusions that intramilitary
litigation resulting from the addition of a Bivens remedy to the existing
grievance system would disrupt discipline, that this disruption would
reduce service efficiency, and that the interest in an efficient military
service outweighs the enlisted men's interest in individual constitu-
tional rights. Thus, the Court effectively concluded that it would be
unwise military personnel policy to provide a damages remedy.69 Yet,
even as it reached this policy conclusion the Court also acknowledged
its historical deference to Congress's competence in, constitutional au-
thority over, and extensive experience with issues of military personnel
management policy.7" Therefore, by the Court's own reasoning, Con-
gress has the competence and constitutional authority to undertake the
same analysis as has the Court. If Congress does so, and reaches a
policy conclusion different than the Court's, it may choose to provide a
statutory damages remedy for enlisted personnel injured as a result of
their superiors' unconstitutional acts. 7 '
An approach more consistent with the Bush-Gilman-Standard Oil
definition of special factors counseling hesitiation to create a Bivens
2404, 2417 (1983). Similar concerns motivated the Court in United States v.
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). Gilman involved a suit by the government against
its employee, rather than between federal employees, and involved common law
rather than constitutional rights. Id at 507-08.
66. See Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2410-17 (1983); United States v. Gilman, 347
U.S. 507, 509-13 (1954).
67. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2417 (1983); see United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S.
507, 509-13 (1954).
68. Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 2417 (1983); see United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S.
507, 509-13 (1954).
69. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
71. See Note, Inramilitary Immunity, supra note 43, at 330, suggesting that the UCMJ
rejects the notion that all intramilitary litigation will interfere with the effective-
ness of the armed forces. See also 10 U.S.C. § 939 (1982) (allowing "any person"
redress for property damage caused by military personnel).
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remedy would have been for the Court simply to leave the issues of
discipline, service efficiency, and personnel policy to Congress while
still declining to create the remedy. Instead, the Chappell Court de-
cided these policy issues, placing its primary emphasis on the threat to
military discipline as a special factor. This emphasis, combined with
the Court's concluding caution that Chappell is not to be read as bar-
ring military personnel from all redress for constitutional wrongs suf-
fered incident to military service,72 may result in lower courts
interpreting Chappell as limited to its facts. Thus, unless an enlisted
person's Bivens cause of action involves facts clearly implicating mat-
ters of discipline arising from a superior officer's personnel manage-
ment decision, that superior may be held personally liable for damages
caused by his unconstitutional acts."
A better view, however, is to interpret Chappell together with
Bush, and to recognize that regardless of the Court's conclusions con-
cerning military discipline, military efficiency, and the individual rights
of military personnel,74 Congress remains the appropriate branch to
make policy decisions concerning military justice, and that respect for
Congress's expertise and constitutional authority is the controlling spe-
cial factor counseling hesitation. Chappell reinforces the growing di-
chotomy between the separate systems of civil and military justice,75
and leaves squarely upon Congress the responsibility for defining, pro-
tecting, and enforcing the rights of this nation's military personnel.76
Alan G Kaufman
72. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983).
73. Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (a Bivens remedy could
be provided to a soldier because there would be no resulting disruption of military
discipline; Chappell limited to its facts). But see Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1983) (Chappell a per se bar of damages suit), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1595 (1984).
74. As the Chappell Court stated, " 'Courts are ill equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have.'" Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2368 (1983) (quoting Warren, The
Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181, 187 (1962)).
75. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983).
76. See generally Burgess, Official Immunity and Civil Liabilityfor Constitutional Torts
Committed by Military Commanders After Butz v. Economou, 89 MIL. L. REV. 25,
58 (1980); Note, Atomic Veterans', supra note 43.
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